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In what way does theocentric Christology express the mutuality better than do 
Christologies with different emphases? (3) What should be the scope of the 
"mutual dependence" among religions? Does it include the way in which each 
religious tradition constructs and enunciates social ethics? 
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THEOCENTRIC CHRISTOLOGY: 
DEFENDED AND TRANSCENDED 
Paul F. Knitter 
Having read and pondered S. Mark Heim's critical analysis of No Other 
Name?, together with the commentaries on his analysis, I am grateful and hon-
ored, as well as sobered and challenged. "Thanks, I needed that," best captures 
my overall feeling. I wrote the book in order to raise some roadsigns for explor-
ing what I consider a pressing problem for Christians; and, though Heim and 
others think my roadsigns are pointing in the wrong direction, they certainly 
have carried on the exploration. Even if they have not converted me from my 
erroneous ways, they have enabled me, with their revealing criticisms and no-
way-out questions, to clarify and redirect the way I want to go. Mainly, they 
have helped me recognize that the best way to defend a theocentric model for 
Christology and interreligious dialogue may be to transcend it. A pluralist theol-
ogy of religions is still very much in the making. While I cannot respond to all 
the issues, both critical and supportive, that were raised in this collection, I can 
cover most of the principal concerns by examining what appear to be the two 
main roadblocks that these critics have erected to a theocentric approach. They 
are telling me that such an approach "does not work" and that it "is not Chris-
tian." In the terminology of Schubert Ogden and revisionist theologians, my 
model falters on criteria of adequacy to human experience and of appropriate-
ness to Christian tradition. Diehard revisionist that I am, I have to take such crit-
icisms seriously. 
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It Does Not Work 
The Critics 
Let me first try to summarize, briefly, the major planks in my colleagues' 
roadblocks; this might make for a bit of repetition, but it is important for me to 
state what I heard before I try to respond to it. 
1. With his usual incisive clarity, Carl Braaten states one of his and Heim's 
main objections: to follow a theocentric model is equivalent to "playing a game 
without any rules."1 Theocentrism provides no norms, no content for theology 
or for encounter with other traditions. Braaten asks, "Where do the new theo-
centrists get their idea of God?"2 and Heim answers that "to be theocentric is to 
be centerless."3 Both are pointing out that one cannot be theocentric directly, 
immediately, nakedly. One becomes centered on God via something/someone 
else, mediatedly. One needs a way to become theocentric. As Braaten points out, 
" . . . Christocentrism is simply the Christian way of being theocentric."4 A major 
presupposition lurks behind these claims. Heim and Braaten are not only arguing 
that we need norms or a center to carry on theology and dialogue; they also 
seem to presuppose that these norms must be above all other norms and that 
the center be fixed. Without such a firm and fixed foundation, we cannot judge 
where God's truth might be found, nor can we enter the fray of dialogue with 
a clear self-identity. Heim states this clearly in his book Is Christ the Only Way?: 
"To say you want God to be at the center, or that you want to know and follow 
God, does not take you very far unless you have some definitive way of locating 
or describing this God."5 Evidently, norms do not really work unless they are 
"definitive." 
2. There is a flip-side to this first criticism: Because theocentrism is without 
rules and well-defined norms, it ends up as a cryptic imperialism. By setting up 
"theos" as the "common ground and goal" for dialogue, I am stuffing all other 
religions into my own theistic categories; I am ruling out of court any possible 
polytheism, any real differences—the "all-at-onceness" of individual religions. 
This is why John Cobb so opposes those who want to begin dialogue with what 
they have in common. Theocentrism leads not to genuine universality but to 
camouflaged "parochialism"6 or, as Dean puts it, to "theological foundational-
ism." As Dean continues, when such parochialism is carried on as a "monologue" 
of basically liberal, first-world white males, it becomes not just a comforting 
opiate for the well-to-do but also a barbed-wire fence excluding and maintaining 
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history's victims.7 Rightly or wrongly, this criticism hits me where it hurts most. 
I take it with utter seriousness. 
An Attempt to Converse 
1. When Heim and Braaten insist that without Christ theocentrism is with-
out content, it seems to me they are slipping into a form of Offenbarungspositiv-
ismus that, theoretically, they do not endorse. They are implying that we can-
not truly know God outside of Jesus Christ. They are good examples of what in 
my book I termed the "Mainline Protestant Model" for a theology of religions, 
which holds that, although there is revelation outside of Jesus Christ, it is never 
effective, "saving" revelation; it provides no saving content. Here I detect funda-
mental differences between us which in this context can only be stated, not 
argued. 
'•Where do the new theocentrists get their idea of God?" (Here I am tempted 
to counter with Dean's teasing question: Where did the theocentric Jesus get his 
idea of God?) My answer to both questions: from the given, fundamental source 
from which we all always draw our experience and idea of God—our personal 
and societal experience of our selves and our world. With many contemporary 
theologians,81 recognize not one but two sources for theology and our Christian 
idea of God: human experience and the Christian fact—our own lives in this 
world and the person and message of Jesus Christ. Both are genuine sources of 
revelation, and both speak to us of God. Neither can be held up, aprioristically, 
as the norm for the other. Both are norms to each other. Our Christian lives and 
our theology are a constant dialogue—mutually clarifying and mutually criticiz-
ing—between our ongoing human experience and our experience of Christ. As 
Bultmann put it, to speak of God we must speak, and continue to speak, of 
humanity; or, with Rahner, we begin and continue Christology and theology 
with anthropology. In a sense, then, we begin theocentrically (I do not mean 
that chronologically). As Christians, we find in Christ our "normative" re-presen-
tation of the God we find in our experience, yet Christ remains our norm only 
insofar as the Christian witness is continually "normed" by our own experience.9 
To embrace theocentrism is not to abandon the uniqueness that Christ has 
for Christians. Heim contends that to be theocentric means to recognize that 
Thomas Dean, "The Conflict of Christologies: A Response to S. Mark Heim," J. E. S. 
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other revelations can be "more precise and certain"10 or more "adequate"11 than 
Christ's revelation. Not really. For Christian theocentrists, while Christ remains 
their adequate, precise, certain representation of God, at the same time they are 
open to the possibility that there may be other such representations/revelations. 
Koyama is right; a theocentric Christology demands mutuality. These other rev-
elations would either make known what is essentially (though perhaps unclearly) 
contained in Christ's revelation, or they would open aspects of Mystery that 
are not contained in Christ. Christians would recognize that, While Jesus Christ 
adequately re-presents God, there is more to God than what Jesus Christ reveals. 
However, Heim and Braaten will ask how Christians would be able to know 
and recognize such other revealors. I would answer: in the same way in which 
they themselves came to affirm Jesus Christ as their savior and revealor, namely, 
on the basis of their human experience. Here I can pose a question that pursued 
me throughout my reading of their critiques: Just why do Heim and Braaten 
proclaim Jesus as God's normative revelation? Certainly, it is not simply because 
"the Bible tells me so." Jesus Christ is their normative revelation because he so 
speaks to their lives, to their human experience. If in interreligious dialogue they 
might find other voices so speaking to their experience (even as that experience 
has been illumined and transformed in Christ), they might also come to recognize 
other "normative" expressions or lures of truth and infinite Mystery. I wonder 
if they have ever felt the power of truth confronting them in non-Christian reli-
gious believers. 
I suspect they would be reluctant to make such admissions, mainly because, 
as I suggested above, for Heim and Braaten (I am not sure about Fraser) a reli-
gious norm cannot really be functional unless it is definitive and absolute, which 
means exclusively-or-inclusively better than others. May I venture the suspicion 
that Heim and Braaten are "anonymous foundationalists." In Christ, it seems 
they have found an Archemedian point that stands outside the rush and change 
and uncertainty of history. With theocentrism, however, I hoped to propose a 
theological version of nonfoundationalism; theocentrism poses the sobering pos-
sibility that there are no final, absolute norms-that all norms are open to the 
challenge and ongoing scrutiny of experience. That is what I wanted to suggest 
with theocentrism—that, while we do know and are committed to the truth 
made known in Jesus Christ, there is always more truth to be known and new 
ways to know it. 
Just where this further truth is to be found and by what other norms be-
sides Jesus Christ cannot be known in advance but only in the ongoing dialogue 
between what we know in Christ and what we experience in history. Today, 
what we experience in history must include the communicative praxis of inter-
religious dialogue. As Koyama urges, mutuality calls us to move beyond all 
ieHeim, "Thinking," p. 5. 
"Ibid., p. 6. 
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notions of exclusivism or inclusivism. "Where do the new theocentrists get their 
idea of God?" I can now answer Braaten's question a little more precisely: from 
Christ and from our dialogue with others. Theocentrism argues that it can never 
be only from Christ. 
2. But how can we carry on this dialogical encounter without slipping into 
the ploys of imperialism, without imposing our Christian norms, our God, on 
their experience? Tom Dean has not only greatly helped me realize more clearly 
how my theocentrism combined with my hypothetical "common ground" puts 
me dangerously close to (if not in the clutches of) a "theocentric foundational-
ism," but he has also helped me respond to this danger. More than Heim and 
Braaten, Dean recognizes that in my book I was already aware of the dangers 
inherent in theocentrism. In holding up theos as the new center for interreligious 
dialogue, I did not have in mind the "God of theism"—not the well-defined per-
sonal creator, or ipsum esse subsistens, but rather the Divine Mystery or Truth 
(Koyama's God of mysticism), seen in certain ways by Christians, yet open to 
utterly different perceptions by others. Dean helps me say what I mean: theos 
here is more of a formal structure than a material content, more of a horizon 
than a vision. Yet, it is not "normless"; we always view this horizon or Truth 
from our location or perspective. Such a perspective is our "first-order theology" 
that helps us formulate a "second-order theory of dialogue"—a theory of dia-
logue, however, which is not "above it all,"12 for both one's theology and one's 
theory of dialogue are to be stretched and reformed constantly in the experience 
of dialogue. 
Nevertheless, I recognize that in order not to remain "above it all," in order 
to respect and be shaken by the utter differentness of religions, in order to 
confront polytheism and the "all-at-onceness" of individual traditions, it is better 
not to speak of a "common ground and goal" for interreligious dialogue, especial-
ly if that ground is dubbed theocentric. Today, instead of stating as I did in No 
Other Name? that dialogue must be "grounded in the hypothesis of a common 
ground and goal for all religions,"131 would rather say that it must be "grounded 
in the common trust in and search for that which makes dialogue possible and 
worthwhile." Here I think I have learned from John Cobb, who warns me: "If 
there are similarities, these will appear during the course of conversation. Of 
course, there will be such similarities . . . The only precondition is the belief that 
conversation is worthwhile."14 Interestingly, though Cobb warns against pre-
established similarities, he voices a preestablished certainty ("of course") that 
similarities will be found; such certainty is rooted in a preestablished trust in 
that which grounds the possibility and value of dialogue. Yet, whatever common 
ground might exist between religions, it must be discovered—or, better, created 
"Dean, "Conflict," p. 28. 
13Paul Knitter, No Other Name? (MaryknoU, NY: Orbis Books, 1985), p. 208. 
"John B. Cobb, Jr., "Response to S. Mark Heim,w/.£S*. 24 (Winter, 1987): 23 (empha-
sis mine). 
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—in the dialogue, and it will always be a "shaky" common ground, in need of 
further strengthening and repossession.15 
But how do we act on this trust? How do we search for the shaky, common 
ground of mutual understanding and growth? Dean says it well: "The problem, 
paraphrasing Heidegger, is how to get into the circle of dialogue in the right 
way"16—that is, without the imperialism of either Christocentrism or theocen-
trism. One conditio sine qua non for doing so is to carry out some form of 
"ideological analysis of interreligious dialogue," as proposed by Dean.17 The first 
steps toward such an analysis will require a liberation from the cliquish mono-
logue of First World white males who have been the patriarchs of interreligious 
dialogue. I have grown more clearly and painfully aware of this need over recent 
years. In a soon-to-be-published collection of essays proposing a new pluralist 
Christian theology of religions, Third-World and feminist theologians have much 
to say to their First World brothers.18 In this volume I urge that a theology of 
religions can be developed relevantly and "safely" only if it itself is in dialogue 
with the many theologies of liberation. 
Here, Fraser was entirely correct in sniffing out what was lurking in my 
book and what has since come into clear consciousness: "The question is wheth-
er Knitter is talking about theocentric Christology or some other kind of Chris-
tology. Does this term adequately describe what he advocates in his book?"19 
I wish she could have asked me that question earlier; it is "right on," as is her 
own answer: "If God is to be named in Knitter's approach, it would have to be 
on the assumption that religious commitment to God lies behind commitment to 
love and justice."20 This "other kind of Christology" and model for interreligious 
encounter I have since identified as soteriocentric rather than theocentric. Tran-
scended by soteriocentrism, theocentrism can, I feel, better attain its intended 
goals. As I have tried to explore in greater detail elsewhere,21 if religious believers 
could agree that the center of their dialogue should revolve not around "Christ" 
(or Buddha or Krishna), or around "God" (or Brahman or Nirvana) but around 
lsMark Kline Taylor, "In Praise of Shaky Ground: The Liminal Christ and Cultural Plur-
alism," Theology Today 43 (April, 1986): 36-51. 
,6Dean, "Conflict," p. 28. 
17Ibid., p. 30. 
18Edited by John Hick and Paul Knitter, The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a 
Pluralist Theology of Religions will be published by Orbis Books in the Fall of 1987. Speak-
ing for the Third World are Aloysius Pieris and Stanley Samartha; for feminist concerns, 
Rosemary Radford Ruether and Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki. 
19Elouise Renich Fraser, "Encountering the Religions: A Response to S. Mark Heim," 
J.E.S. 24 (Winter, 1987): 33. 
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"salvation"-that is, a shared concern about and effort to remove the sufferings 
that rack the human family today-perhaps the religions would have "the right 
of way" of "getting into the circle of dialogue." To answer Koyama's final ques-
tion, theocentrism not only includes but should begin with social ethics. 
Such a salvation-centered starting point would call on different religious 
believers to share not only a common concern for human suffering, however it 
might confront them in their environment, but also a common praxis in trying 
to remove such suffering. On the basis of such shared praxis, the religions would 
then enter into shared theoretical reflexion on how their different experiences 
and different beliefs motivate and direct them in this praxis of liberation. Shared 
liberative praxis, it is hoped, would be the basis for mutual doctrinal understand-
ing and clarification. Such a soteriocentric approach, if it were endorsed by vari-
ous religious communities, could give some practical substance to Dean's rather 
vague "alternative to Knitter's theocentric . . . [and Heim's] christocentric foun-
dationalism,"22 in which he urges that we begin the dialogue with "certain for-
mal principles of truth that can provide us with criteria of the universal relevance 
of religious traditions whose material norms of truth remain irreducibly different 
and particular to each tradition."23 In their struggle to promote human welfare, 
each religion would indicate its universal relevance, while its material norms for 
carrying out that struggle could (not necessarily "would") remain irreducibly 
different. 
This means that soteriocentrism would not so easily fall victim to Heim's 
objection that here we have nothing but an "ethical absolute" instead of his 
more honest and upfront christocentric absolute. In a soteriocentric model for 
dialogue, each religion understands and is committed to its particular approach 
to salvation and liberation, but each recognizes that this goal of human fulfill-
ment is ever more than what they now know or think. To describe this process, 
Langdon Gilkey has appealed to a paradox that is more easily lived than under-
stood: while each religion remains absolutely committed to its grasp of sotena, 
at the same time it recognizes that this grasp is always relative and in need of 
further clarification and possible correction.24 For Christians this means that 
Christ remains their way to which they are "absolutely" committed; yet, the 
center of their lives and their dialogue with others is the ongoing, communicative 
praxis of working and speaking with others in order to remove suffering and 
bring salvation. In more Christian terms, the center of their lives and of dialogue 
is, as it was for Jesus, their efforts to seek first the reign of God. Such a center is 
not fixed; it moves and refocuses as we work with others to promote human sal-
vation-a less secure center, yes, but one that bears more challenge and demands 
more faith. 
"Dean, "Conflict," p. 29. 
"Ibid., p. 30. 
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It Is Not Christian 
The Critics 
1. In reviewing the claims that my proposal for a pluralist theology of reli-
gions betrays Christian tradition and conviction, I must admit that especially with 
Braaten and Fraser I sometimes felt I was being declared, rather than proved, 
guilty. Fraser implies that, while I try to listen to the other religions, I am not 
giving full ear and respect to the New Testament and that my concern for plural-
ism is not matched by my concern for Christian identity. In other words, I am 
too easily selling out. Braaten is more direct, suggesting that I am hamstringing 
authentic dialogue because I am not "committed to the core convictions" of my 
Christian faith2S or that I have abandoned the genuine Christian notion of salva-
tion, which must include the good news that "Jesus is Lord, Christ, savior, and 
God."26 Somewhat rhetorically, Braaten summarizes and then ostracizes my 
position: "Christ must decrease in order that God might increase-what a propo-
sition for Christian theology!"27 
Heim and Braaten, with help from Dean, do offer more substantiated rea-
sons why they think my position is incompatible with Christian tradition, mainly 
by trying to show that I misrepresent or misuse the New Testament witness. 
Their principal contention is that the world of the New Testament was not at all 
as "classicist" as I make it out to be; therefore, the "one and only" language 
about Christ was not, as I suggest, a "cultural necessity" or part of the dispens-
able cultural medium used to deliver an abiding transcultural message. The New 
Testament world was teeming with pluralism. So, when the early Christians 
declared that there was "no other name," they did so consciously and counter-
culturally. The early church faced an abundance of pluralist options and rejected 
them. Therefore, Braaten argues, my pluralist proposal delivers a ho-hum sense 
of dèjâ-vu that would be seen by the early Jesus followers as well as by Chris-
tians through the ages as another attempt to squeeze the image of Jesus into a 
mold that the early church expressly rejected. Heim further warns against basing 
such a squeeze on ontology; he feels that much of my reinterpretation of New 
Testament language naively imagines that, if we can move from a classicist ontol-
ogy of substance to a processive ontology of change and multiplicity, we will 
automatically shed our exclusivist shackles. 
Dean adds greater force to these objections when he reminds me that one 
cannot separate truth and language (cultural medium and essential message) as 
neatly as I apparently do. Language and truth are inseparable ; if one is to change, 
it will change with the other. The hermeneutical task, therefore, must not dissect 
them but seek to interpret the whole package of truth-in-language. Braaten adds 
that, if I would accept the truth of New Testament one-and-only language, I 
"Braaten, "Christocentric," p. 19. 
"Ibid., p. 20. 
27Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
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could truly satisfy my universalist pinnings and embrace, with him, a "christo-
centric universalism"; instead of having to find a saving God under every reli-
gious rock that I pick up, I could affirm that all will be saved in the end through 
Christ. 
2. Braaten has a final trinitarian objection, which he summarizes sharply: 
"I do not see anything resembling the Trinity in Knitter's constructive theology. 
. . . If one can speak of God who is really God apart from Christ, there is indeed 
no reason for the doctrine of the Trinity. Some kind of Unitarianism will do the 
job."28 I have abandoned a "christocentric trinitarianism" for a "unitarian theo-
centrism." I am a crypto-Arian, destroying the ontological identity between 
Christ and God.29 
An Attempt to Converse 
1. Regarding the apparent declarations of my infidelity to core Christian 
convictions, I would respond in general that indeed I am stating that maybe, 
just maybe, the proposition that "Christ must decrease in order that God might 
increase" may have some validity for Christian theology. (After all, the Gospel 
writers have Jesus announcing that the Father is greater than he [Jn. 15:28] or 
that he cannot be called good in comparison to God [Mk. 10:18].) That is why 
I wrote No Other Name?—to argue that there are sound scriptural-theological 
reasons why Christians can move toward a pluralist theology of religions and a 
theocentric (read: soteriocentric) Christology without losing their identity and 
core convictions and without snubbing the New Testament witness. Therefore, 
I greatly appreciate and have learned from Heim's and Braaten's critique of my 
assessment of the New Testament witness to Christ. I admit that I should have 
been more aware of the cultural-religious complexity and the pluralism of the 
New Testament Sitz im Leben. The cultural ambient of the early churches does 
not fit Lonergan's description of classicist culture as neatly as I implied. How-
ever-and this would be my reminder to Heim and Braaten-neither is the reli-
gious pluralism of the New Testament world a mirror image of our present plur-
alistic experience. If I have oversimplified in one direction, they may do so in 
the other. 
In one way, I did recognize in my book that, in making their one-and-only 
claims about Jesus, his early followers were taking a counter-cultural position. 
I described this as "survival language"—defining one's minority identity by rub-
bing against the cultural grain.30 However, this was primarily the grain of Graeco-
Roman culture, where all breeds of pluralism abounded. In taking this counter-
cultural stance, the New Testament Christians were carrying on what can be 
called, I think, the classicist content of their Jewish cultural background. Chris-
tianity was and remains a Jewish religion. In confronting the Gentile world, they 
MIbid.,p.21. 
a9Ibid., p. 18. 
30Knitter,M> Other Name?, p. 184. 
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carried forward their deep-seated Jewish convictions, rooted in Hebraic mono-
theistic convictions, that God was one, the Messiah would be one, and the 
Mountain from which the glory of God would shine for all would be one. For 
the Jesus followers, of course, this one God/Messiah/Mt. Sion (church) was 
embodied in Jesus Christ. Both as Jews and under the enduring influence of 
their Jewish past, the early Christians could be called classicists; they would, 
therefore, explicitly reject religious pluralism (though like their Jewish brothers/ 
sisters they engaged in an implicit dialogue with and assimilated much from 
the religious world surrounding them). Today, however, Christians, like many 
contemporary Jews, are asking whether they can carry on their tradition and its 
message for the world without these earlier classicist claims of "one and only" or 
"finality." Does monotheism require exclusivism? 
There were other cultural-historical reasons why the early Christians refused 
to be swept up in the pluralist currents of the times. This is where the experience 
and intent of religious pluralism then, I would suggest, was markedly different 
from what it is today. In a recent study of New Testament understandings of the 
uniqueness of Jesus, Frans Jozef van Beeck painted much the same picture of 
the pluralist options available to the early Christians as do Heim and Braaten, 
but he added a caveat of which they seem unaware: "Let us clearly state . . . 
that a simple 'return to the New Testament' would be a historic illusion. Modern 
pluralism is a far cry from the pluralism of the first century."31 The primary 
difference is that the pluralism of the first century was far more inclined toward 
—indeed, ridden with—relativism and/or syncretism. Religious tolerance was 
disposed to tolerate anything; gods were accepted not because of inherent truth 
but because they were the local deities; differences really did not matter, espe-
cially in the syncretistic cults. This is indeed a "far cry" from the model of reli-
gious pluralism and dialogue that is being explored by contemporary advocates 
of a new Christian theology of religions; as I tried to make clear in my book, 
these contemporary theologians are not proposing a simplistic return to notions 
of "common essence" or "anything goes" or "we cannot judge." With the early 
Christians, they would have been opposed to the relativizing, tranquilizing atti-
tudes of the first-century Greco-Roman world. In the new dialogue with other 
religions, unity is based on difference; cooperation includes confrontation; open-
ness to others arises from commitment to Christ. Before he stamps his déjà vu on 
these new views, my friend Carl Braaten should take a better look. 
I did not think my case for the cultural conditionedness of New Testament 
one-and-only language is based as strongly on claims for a prevalent classicist 
ontology as Heim suggests. I did propose other reasons why Christians took up 
such language—for example, an initial apocalyptic mentality, survival language.32 
Further, I am surprised, even somewhat disappointed, that neither Heim nor 
Braaten took up what I think is one of the most weighty reasons why today we 
31"Professing the Uniqueness of Christ," Chicago Studies 24 (Spring, 1985): 33-34. 
"Knitter, No Other Name?, pp. 183-184. 
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can/should reevaluate our understanding of such early claims as "no other name" 
—that is, Krister Stendahl's case that these claims are confessional or love lan-
guage. No matter whether one was immersed in a classicist or a pluralist culture, 
or embraced either a substantive or a processive ontology, the primary purpose 
of such confessional language was not to exclude others but to confess Jesus, 
not to make ontological statements on the value of other religious figures but to 
proclaim what Jesus Christ can really (meaning, of course, ontologically) do to a 
person's life.33 
This brings me to the bottom line of my present efforts to correlate the New 
Testament assertions of Jesus' uniqueness with my contemporary experience of 
religious pluralism and historical relativity. Tom Dean helps me formulate it. 
I agree with him, even more now than when I wrote the book, that one cannot 
separate the historically conditioned language about uniqueness from the in-
tended essential truth about Jesus, that it is impossible to remove the historical 
husk from essential, unchanging truth, and that much of the New Testament wit-
ness of Jesus is corrigibly exclusivistic- but, then, what does it mean to remain 
faithful to the New Testament witness? I think Dean is right that we don't have 
to lay out an explicit, material legitimization from the New Testament for every 
new christological move today; we don't have to cover all our linguistic tracks 
from then till now, for language and truth stand and change together. It is suffi-
cient, Dean tells us, to establish "family resemblances . . . fascinating and com-
plex historical relationships with those that have gone before."34 
Though again frustrated by Dean's final vagueness, I agree. However, I think 
that a precondition for establishing such family resemblances is to bear in mind 
that, although one can never separate language and truth, neither should one 
identify them. Though we will never see the moon without the finger, neither 
can we take the finger for the moon. Therefore, some such distinction between 
what the early Christians wanted to say and how they said it is important, though 
always elusive. Without being too elusive, I come to my bottom line: essential 
for "family resemblances" with and fidelity to the New Testament witness about 
Jesus is that we confess that God has really spoken in Jesus the Christ for all 
peoples of all times and that this confession include and be guided by our praxis 
of working toward Jesus' vision of the reign of God in this world. In order to 
confess this "really" and commit ourselves to this "praxis" it is not necessary 
to confess that God has spoken "only" or "finally" in Jesus. Consistent with 
our soteriocentric approach, we can say that it is not in the "only" but in the 
"really" and in our "praxis" for the reign of God that we are faithful to the New 
Testament. I agree heartily with Braaten that "the uniqueness of Jesus Christ lies 
in his universality"35—yes, in his universality, not in his exclusivity. 
With such an understanding of fidelity to the New Testament, we are open 
33Ibid., pp. 184-186. 
"Dean, "Conflict," p. 27. 
"Braaten, "Christocentric," p. 19. 
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to the possibility that there may be truths "for all peoples of all times" in other 
religious traditions and figures. Responding to Koyama's call for a "coincidentia 
oppositorum" we would be open to the "complementary uniqueness" or the 
"complementary finality" of Jesus and Buddha. 
2. Braaten's sweeping questions concerning my trinitarian fidelity would 
merit more than the few comments possible here. Sometimes I think we would 
be better off to follow the suggestions of some Greek Orthodox theologians and 
base our theology of religions on the third person rather than the second person 
of the Trinity—on a pneumatology rather than a Christology.36 Be that as it 
may, I simply have to disagree with Braaten, for I believe that "one can speak 
of God who is really God apart from Christ" and that one can do this without 
denying the doctrine of the Trinity and reverting to unitarianism. I can say this 
and still affirm that one cannot speak of the Father without the Son/Word and 
the Spirit. It seems that much hinges on how one understands the unity between 
Jesus and the second person of the Trinity. Braaten seems inclined toward a 
"enhypostatic" understanding of this unity, identifying the second person of the 
Trinity with the person of Jesus-and thus confining the Word to the person of 
Jesus. I understand Chalcedon to have affirmed that, in the one human being of 
Jesus, the divine and human natures were "inseparable" without collapsing their 
utter differences.37 Inseparable in Jesus does not mean confined to Jesus. So, I 
follow the Logos Christology and trinitarian perspective of Raimundo Panikkar, 
who suggests that, while we Christians surely must affirm that Jesus is the Logos/ 
Christ, we cannot so neatly or exclusively affirm that the Logos/Christ is Jesus.38 
The "incarnating" activity of the Logos is actualized in but not restricted to 
Jesus. The God manifested in and as Jesus of Nazareth is the only true God (so I 
am not an Arian), but there is more to that God than Jesus. 
For this opportunity to converse on matters important to all of us, I sincere-
ly thank the editors of J.E.S., S. Mark Heim, and all the others who added their 
words and energy. It shows me that interreligious concerns can make for better 
intrareligious friends. 
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